A number of Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) accountable care organizations (ACOs) experienced significant, unanticipated changes in their 2017 performance year historical benchmarks and performance expenditures. These changes were not consistent in direction or magnitude. The exclusion of some nursing facility visits from MSSP assignment, effective in 2017, is the likely cause of the unanticipated changes.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) now excludes nursing facility provider evaluation and management visit codes with place of service (POS) 31 as a qualifying claim type for beneficiary assignment. This assignment methodology change is referred to as the POS 31 exclusion. It started with the 2017 performance year and is also applied to the corresponding baseline years for all MSSP tracks.
Some ACOs likely lost and some likely gained costly nursing facility beneficiaries due to the new exclusion in both the baseline and performance years. The POS 31 exclusion only works as intended if POS codes correctly differentiate between Part A skilled nursing facilities and other nursing facility patient services. Unfortunately, our analysis across the Medicare 5% sample indicates that POS codes for nursing facility-based claims may not always be reliable.
To read more about the possible impact of these changes, read this article by Tia Sawhney, Kate Fitch, and Cory Gusland.
Under the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, healthcare providers that participate in a Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) as Track 3 accountable care organizations may qualify for the advanced Alternative Payment Model 5% bonus. Track 3 was first offered in 2016. This paper by Milliman consultants discusses first-year MSSP Track 3 performance and possible drivers of success.
We recently used machine learning techniques to understand key drivers of Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) financial performance. Of the 190-plus objective accountable care organization (ACO) features reviewed, ACO baseline efficiency proved to be the most important financial performance driver we identified. Another way of putting it is that MSSP rewarded inefficient ACOs more than ACOs that have attained efficiency.
You may be asking, “How did you measure baseline efficiency?” The chart below tells an interesting story.
We analyzed ACO baseline efficiency by reviewing ACO baseline expenditures that were unadjusted, risk-adjusted, and geographic-risk-adjusted. Risk-adjusted per capita expenditures were adjusted to account for each ACO’s average risk score and mix of entitlement categories. Geographic risk-adjusted per capita expenditures were adjusted to account for Medicare reimbursement levels in each ACO’s area.
Below are a few interesting notes:
1. Despite adjusting for risk levels, mix of entitlement categories, and reimbursement levels, there is still significant variation in baseline per capita expenditures. See the third column above for this wide range of variation.
2. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has already made MSSP rule changes that balance the rewards between ACOs at different levels of starting efficiencies. Past financial performance in MSSP agreement period 1 may not be a strong indicator of performance in agreement period 2. ACOs should understand how these rule changes affect them.
Beyond baseline efficiency, we found that several other features were strongly associated with gross savings:
1. National fee-for-service (FFS) trends higher than local market trends
2. Location in the Southeast and south central regions
3. Low performance year expenditures for short-term inpatient admissions
4. High baseline per capita expenditures, unadjusted
5. High CMS-hierarchical condition category (HCC) risk scores
However, we also found that these features still explained less than half of the variation in gross savings across ACOs. This may indicate that ACO care management efforts are accounting for some of the remaining variation.
The full report is posted at Milliman Insight and includes a deeper dive into research conducted by Jill Herbold, Cory Gusland, and myself.
The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) makes significant changes to the Medicare payment system by introducing a quality-based payment model. While MACRA primarily affects Part B clinicians, there are numerous implications that Medicare Advantage (MA) plans should consider. A strategic approach can help MA plans understand and respond to the legislation.
In the article “MACRA and Medicare Advantage plans: Synergies and potential opportunities,” Milliman actuaries explore the answers to the following questions:
• How will MACRA affect MA plans’ provider payments?
• What synergies exist between MACRA’s quality scoring and the MA Stars quality program?
• How can MA plans help providers achieve Qualifying Participant (QP) status?
• What incentives exist under MACRA for providers to improve risk score coding?
• How are MA plans in the market responding to MACRA?
Read Milliman’s “MACRA: The series” to learn how the legislation will affect providers, alternative payment models, and health plans